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I. INTRODUCTION
The utmost specimen of a classic corporate case is Mein-
hard v. Salmon.! Cardozo's powerful rhetoric and sensitive
morality instills confidence in every student who doubts the
propriety of this breed of capitalism. Generations of corpo-
rate lawyers have been schooled in its memorable language
finding broad fiduciary obligations on managers of other
peoples' money:
. Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law, rI-uX. Nop.
(Law Dip.) '87, Athens U. Law School; LL.M. '88, S.J.D. (Econ. Anal. of
L.) '92, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Craig Albert, Phillip
Blumberg, C. Robert Morris, Ellen Ash Peters, and Steve Utz as well as
the 1998 Canadian Law and Economics Association conference
participants for their invaluable comments.1 249 N.Y. 458 (1928).
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length, are forbid-
den to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate ....
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd.2
A fundamental paradox, however, lies in the attraction
of Meinhard to corporate law teachers. The case's appeal
appears to lie in its rhetoric and morality, while most cor-
porate law courses seek to make economic sense out of
business law.3 No less an economic analysis scholar than
Richard Posner, in studying Cardozo's opinions closely in
his book on Cardozo's reputation, categorizes Meinhard as a
moralistic case, which exemplifies Cardozo's rhetorical
powers. Posner, however, fails to realize that Cardozo's un-
canny economic intuition was equally at work here as in
any other of his famous opinions.4
2 Id. at 464.
3 The importance of economic analysis in the teaching of corporate
law is evident in the results of a survey on the methods used in the basic
corporate law course, where 64% of the professors stated they use
economic analysis often or recurringly (13 often and 30 recurringly, for
43 out of 67 responses; 17 more use it a little). See Robert B. Thompson,
The Basic Business Associations Course: An Empirical Study of Methods
and Content, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 438, 445 (1998), available at
<http'J/ls.wustl.edu/-thompson/themes.htm> (visited Feb. 21, 1999). The
paradoxical use in this setting of Meinhard v. Salmon is evident because
six out of the seven current Corporate Law casebooks include Meinhard
(the authors of the books that include it are O'Kelley & Thompson;
Seligman; Hamilton; Choper, Coffee & Gilson; Cary & Eisenberg; only
that of Solomon, Schwartz, Bauman & Weiss does not).
4 Posner calls Meinhard "the most famous of Cardozo's moralistic
opinions" and argues that "it is possible to object that [the above excerpt
from Meinhard is] just words, and florid ones at that. But they are
memorable words, and they set a tone." RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO A
STUDY IN REPUTATION 104-105 (1989) (discussing Meinhard in a single
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This short article seeks to overturn the myth that the
decision in Meinhard was based on morality alone. If Mein-
hard is not Cardozo's best opinion from an economic per-
spective, it is certainly one of the best examples of his as-
tonishing gift to provide the economically advantageous
rules in an irresistible dress of moral appeal and graceful
prose. The economic principle of broad fiduciary obligations
that lies behind Meinhard forms a cornerstone of manage-
rial capitalism that has allowed passive investment in pro-
fessionally managed corporations. The Meinhard principle
also enabled the world-wide spread of managerial capital-
ism. Moreover, to the consternation of continental Euro-
pean legal systems that are currently trying to emulate the
creative drive of common-law-developed venture capital,
Cardozo has already proffered the answer: under narrow
fiduciary duties, projects with primarily remote opportuni-
ties will not be financed. Indeed, the average venture capi-
tal investment in the U.S. is a minority equity stake in a
young enterprise.8 By contrast, abroad minority equity in-
paragraph in a 150 page book while Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339 (1928), receives a 15-page treatment and the obscure Hynes v.
N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229 (1921), occupies 9 pages).
5 See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the
U.S. and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate
Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 865, 875 (1998) (detailing how
total venture capital investment in U.S. firms averages a 34% equity
stake, 19% of which is owned by the lead venture capitalist). It is
interesting to note that since the average stake of the venture capitalist
is a minority stake, it creates doubts about the convoluted theory that
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have an implicit contract about
control which the venture capitalists return to the entrepreneur when
they sell their stakes at an initial public offering (IPO). See generally
Bernard S. Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243
(1998). Note that if a minority investment were appealing in a narrow-
fiduciary-obligation legal system, nothing would preclude venture
capitalists of France, Germany, or Japan from conducting an IPO in the
US.
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vestments are avoided, and the venture capitalists lend to
much more established and safer enterprises.
Part II of this article will briefly discuss Meinhard and
the potential merits of Justice Andrews' bitter dissent. Part
DI will recast the facts of the case in the typical example of
a passive investor's decision whether to invest in a project.
This will show how Cardozo's outcome helps financing and
lowers the cost of capital. Part IV shows that the desirabil-
ity of broad fiduciary obligations is unassailable even by the
most deregulatory-spirited application of the Coase test: not
only are the broad fiduciary duties of Meinhard the appro-
priate default rule, but broad fiduciary obligations are nec-
essary even as a contracting tool. This conclusion points out
that, however justified the hiatus of discretionary takeover
defenses may have been, it may be time to return to higher
standards of fiduciary obligations in the context of defen-
sive tactics. The appendix provides a formal analysis which
demonstrates that projects which will provide a large part
of their expected return in probabilistic opportunities (as
opposed to safe cash flows) will only be undertaken by risk-
averse managers if fiduciary obligations are expansive.
6 Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 877-78 (arguing that 30% of all
venture capital disbursements in the U.S. are to the earliest stages of
firms: seed, start-up, and early stage financings, while only 16% of
Japanese venture capital goes to firms in similar stages and even that
tends to go to much safer and less innovative firms in safer industries).
Compare Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corporation and the
Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons from Abroad? The German
Experience, 1988 COLUN. Bus. L. REv. 775, 787-89 (1988) (noting the
difficulty that young firms face in getting venture capital financing in
Germany).
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II. THE DISSENT'S POINT: CAN'T PARTNERS REAP THE
FRUIT OF THEIR LUCK?
The facts of the case are not complicated. The wool mer-
chant Morton Meinhard helped a budding real estate devel-
oper, Walter Salmon, finance a project in exchange for a
share of the profits. Salmon had identified an appealing in-
vestment in the Hotel Bristol, a building in the northwest
corner of Fifth Avenue and Forty-Second Street in Manhat-
tan. The Bristol, with its bay windows and ornate arched
friezes, had character but would soon be outdated. Its
seven-story structure had a 74 foot face on Fifth Avenue
and a 125 foot face on Forty-Second Street, for a footprint of
Picture 1: The Bristol in 1928. Note the distance and height of the
next skyscraper on Forty-Second Street. Corbis/Bettman©
9,312.5 square feet.7 The picture, taken from across the in-
tersection, shows the Bristol in the foreground in 1928. The
two developers, operating through the only visible partner,
7 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 223 A.D. 663, 667-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st
Dept. 1928).
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Salmon, obtained a 20-year lease of the Bristol starting in
1902. Given its golden location-two blocks from Grand
Central Station and across from the new Public Library
that replaced in the early twenties the reservoir which was
there at the beginning of the lease-it is not surprising that
after costly renovations and a few years of losses, the opera-
tion turned magnificently profitable. Their cooperation was
otherwise uneventful until the lease was about to expire.
Elbridge Gerry, the owner of the land, unaware of Mein-
hard's existence, approached Salmon with a proposal to ex-
pand the lease to encompass several adjoining lots which
were by that time also owned by him. The new project was
to have a 100.5 foot face on Fifth Avenue and 208 foot face
on Forty-Second Street.8 Its footprint, at 20,904 square feet,
was more than double that of the old building. Salmon, no
longer in need of Meinhard's financial backing, accepted the
offer in his own name and undertook a project of an entirely
different scope than renovating and managing a single
building. The new project ended up much larger than ini-
tially planned. While it was contracted to be at least 25 sto-
ries, comparable in size with the neighboring high-rise on
Forty-Second Street, the resulting structure was an impos-
ing 59-story art-deco skyscraper resembling a cubist puzzle.
Its picture shows how its vertical lines and its soaring pres-
ence provide a dramatic backdrop for the classic and hori-
zontally laid out New York Public Library. The new build-
ing was obviously a feather in the cap of its architects, the
premier architectural firm of Shreve, Lamb & Harmon, de-
signers of the Empire State Building, the General Motors
Building, and Hunter College, among others.9 The building
has always been known as "500 Fifth Avenue." It is still the
second tallest building in the neighborhood after the Em-
pire State Building.
See id.
See ELLIOT WILLENSKY & NORAL WHITE, AIA GUIDE TO NEW YORK
CITY 240 (3d ed. 1988); 4 MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARCHITECTS 54
(Adolf I. Placzek ed. 1982).
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Picture 2: 500 Fifth Avenue in 1998.
Compare the location and height of the
neighboring skyscraper.
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The dissent's point is well made: the partners' original
project was of an entirely different scope than Gerry's new
proposal. Had the lease simply been renewed, Meinhard
certainly should have been allowed to participate. Because
of its uniqueness from the original project, the new proposal
was one that Salmon could easily have acquired on his own
given his reputation as a savvy real estate developer.
The strength of the dissent is not so much that this offer
was clearly a fruit of Salmon's personal efforts, skills, or re-
putation, but that even partners are entitled to some per-
sonal sphere of independent activity. That Salmon joined a
partnership clearly should not preclude him from ever con-
ducting business in his personal capacity outside it. The
dissenting Justice Andrews strongly believed that the offer
to Salmon was an offer to the individual, not the partner.
The issue, however, is not the application of an existing
standard but the creation by Cardozo of a new one. Thus,
the issue is not where the divide lies between the personal
versus partnership opportunity in this particular case (after
all, Cardozo was not above distorting facts to reach his
holdings'0 and the economic ramifications of this decision
actually favored the ostensibly losing party, Salmon") but
10 The opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. can easily be
interpreted as the result of a judge on a mission to adopt the rule that
only foreseeable plaintiffs can have negligence claims. In the opinion the
facts are distorted and omitted to stress the remote nature of the
plaintiffs injury (which was suffered at the "other end" of the station
platform while in truth "over 10 feet away" and constituted of a
stammer) from the railroad's negligence (in helping two "Italian"-looking
types onto a leaving train with a large packet that the opinion makes"small"; neither the immensity of the explosion nor the lack of any injury
to the Italians is mentioned in the opinion). Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). See also POSNER, supra note 4, at 33-48,
(discussing Palsgraf).
1 Salmon retained majority control of the expanded project, which
due to the depression was not successful, and anecdotally, only the cash
infusion of Meinhard saved Salmon from ruin during the lean years.
Salmon felt so grateful that he sent Cardozo a bouquet of flowers on each
anniversary of the opinion. Moreover, when Meinhard died, his share
was sold to the Salmon family at the depressed prices of the day. See
Correspondence with C. Robert Morris, Professor of Law at Minnesota
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rather Cardozo's message that fiduciary obligations must be
interpreted broadly. The Meinhard opinion can be credited
for this legal system's escape from the narrow construction
of fiduciary obligations that allows countries like the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany to condone such broad manage-
rial powers that allowed Daimler-Benz management, for
example, to hide $2.8 billion - 17% of its post-
announcement capitalization, 26% of its book value - from
their shareholders until forced to reveal it by U.S. stan-
dards. 2
Thus, we start discerning the true issue of Meinhard v.
Salmon. Managers, just like Salmon, inevitably receive
some advantages due to the visibility, the networking, and
the general activity of their positions. Some of those advan-
tages may clearly flow from the manager's persona, such as
individual skills, reputation, or charisma. Others may arise
from the organization and could be clearly traced to the
manager's employer or principal. Perhaps one could in-
quire into the state of mind of the offeror, such as Gerry,
when this advantage involves an outsider's offer. The un-
usual facts of Meinhard made such an inquiry useless be-
cause Salmon was ostensibly the sole owner and operator of
the Bristol. Gerry did not know any other entity to be in-
volved in the lease of the Bristol. Often, however, the ad-
vantage the manager receives will involve not an offer but
the random appearance of an opportunity. Salmon's daily
route to the Bristol may have created the opportunity by
Law School, Feb. 2, 1998 (on fie with author) (relating facts extracted
and generously shared by Professor Morris from Walter Salmon Jr. in
1983-84). Furthermore, Professor Craig Albert, who examined the record
at the New York City Bar while on a breather from correcting exams,
claims that Meinhard was trying to force Salmon into giving him a better
deal than 50% participation by dragging his heels (he transferred his
interest to his wife, and when Salmon accepted in principle a 50%
participation of Meinhard but not of his wife, Meinhard brought suit).
See E-mail from Craig Albert, Associate Professor, Seton Hall Law
School, Feb. 9, 1999 (on file with author).
12 See The Global 1000, Bus. Wm., July 12, 1993, at 52; see also
Floyd Norris, Market Place: Daimler-Benz paves the way for other
German companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, at D8.
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allowing him to observe the activity in a building a few
blocks away. Alternatively, Salmon, as the manager, may
have found an unclaimed valuable item in the premises of
the Bristol. Random accruals must be separated between
those that go to the agent-manager and those that go to the
employer-principal. Therefore, the law must draw a line to
separate the position between what opportunities should
accrue to the individual and what should accrue to the
partnership, and the dispute between Cardozo and Andrews
ultimately involves where that line should be drawn. The
facts of Meinhard v. Salmon can be stylized to form the pro-
totype of the choices involved, not only for the parties but
also for the legal system.
HI. BENEFITS OF BROAD FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Broad fiduciary obligations facilitate the financing of
ventures, mitigate the effects of managers' risk-aversion,
align the financing decisions of investors with the true eco-
nomic desirability of projects, and align the incentives of
managers with the benefit to the economy and the desires
of investors. The facts of Meinhard are a beautiful illustra-
tion of these effects.
A. Broad Duties Enable Financing
To observe the influence of fiduciary obligations on the
financing of the Bristol, we must begin with hypothetical
alternatives in which Meinhard could have invested his
capital. Suppose that for a risk comparable to a real estate
project like that of the Bristol, Meinhard could place funds
in the wool trade and receive an expected annual real re-
turn of 5%. Salmon's proposal to develop the Bristol would
only be attractive if it offered at least the same 5%. Thus,
the question is how Meinhard's expected return, before in-
vesting in 1902, would have been influenced by the scope of
fiduciary obligations.
Let us suppose that Meinhard and Salmon would split
the renovation costs of $200,000 and the ensuing profits
(Vol. 1999
equally (in truth most of Salmon's contribution may have
been in labor, but that does make it immune from valua-
tion). Therefore, Meinhard expects his $100,000 contribu-
tion to produce $5,000 of net real profits annually for the
duration of the lease. Since $5,000 is 5% of the $100,000
investment, for Meinhard to realize a 5% return he must
expect to recover $100,000 at the end of the lease. Suppose
that three possible outcomes are expected with the follow-
ing probabilities at the end of the 20 years. First, Gerry
may sever their ties with 25% probability, leaving the de-
velopers empty-handed. Second, Gerry may renew the lease
with 50% probability, or third, he may propose the expan-
sion to the entire block with 25% probability. Extension
continues the $5,000 annual profit of Meinhard for the fore-
seeable future. For a cost of capital of 5%, this perpetuity is
worth $100,000, or $50,000 in this case where it is a 50%
proposition. This is all that Andrews would give to Mein-
hard, and it would fall short of producing the 5% he re-
quires.
Cardozo, however, also allows Meinhard to participate in
the expanded lease. We should suppose that the larger ven-
ture was expected to provide $10,000 annual net profits to
each, which means $200,000 for someone, like Meinhard,
who has a 5% cost of capital. The 25% chance of earning
$200,000 is worth $50,000. Thus, Cardozo's wide fiduciary
obligations do restore the $100,000 investment to Mein-
hard, render the project attractive, and enable its financing.
The lesson of the Meinhard example is that broad fidu-
ciary obligations lead investors to expect a greater fraction
of a project's remote potential. This expectation of greater
remote gains allows the financing of projects with meager
immediate gains. In the extreme cases where most of a
project's value is in remote opportunities, even if the inves-
tor were to receive 100% of the project, its immediate re-
turns would not provide the necessary return. By contrast,
if the remote opportunities are considered part of the proj-
ect, the investor would need less participation to receive the
required return. This impossibility of financing under nar-
row fiduciary duties is formally developed in the appendix.
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The difficulty of financing projects under narrow duties
exists even if the parties may override it, i.e., if it is only a
default rule. Some cash-flow-poor projects would be unable
to change the default rule. One can readily see an example
of this effect by considering that overriding the default in
the stylized Meinhard example, above, would cost $1,000 in
legal fees. That would require Meinhard to increase his con-
tribution by $1,000 and would leave the project unable to be
financed. Meinhard would require slightly more than 50%
participation to recoup the $1,000, but such a division may
be insufficient for Salmon, either because it increases his
risk too much (explained below) or because his reduced cash
flow cannot sustain his livelihood until the end of the lease.
Thus, Cardozo's broad fiduciary obligations are a crucial
step toward the formation of an economic system that relies
on financing by passive investors and on the decentralized
decision-making that financial markets make possible. But
broad fiduciary obligations do much more than enable the
financing of projects with remote value.
B. Broad Duties Mitigate Risk-Aversion
Narrow fiduciary obligations aggravate risk-aversion
problems. Take our paradigmatic Salmon and the resulting
risks of the project to him if it could have been financed
under narrow fiduciary duties. Since the partnership will
receive an expected value of only $100,000 in 1922
according to Andrews, for Meinhard to receive his 5%
return on his investment, his participation must be 61.61%
of the project. 3 Salmon's share of the Bristol's income is
reduced, but he is compensated by the fact that he will
receive the entire gain from an expansion of the lease in
13 The calculation goes as follows. Meinhard must still invest
$100,000, and the only issue is what fraction of the enterprise that will
be considered to comprise. The fraction must be set so that when applied
to annual earnings and the final value that Andews' interpretation gives
to the firm, it allows Meinhard to have realized a 5% return. That is
61.61%, giving Meinhard $6,161 annually and making his share of the
terminal value $61,610.
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1922. Notice, however, that this has made the project
riskier for Salmon, by increasing the fraction of his total
value that is contingent on the expansion materializing. If
Salmon is risk-averse, as managers who must stake their
future on a single firm (or even a few) are, then narrowing
the fiduciary obligations is undesirable. By contrast, the
typical investor is diversified and nearly risk-neutral.
Broad fiduciary obligations move risk from the risk-averse
to the risk-neutral, making the entrepreneurs better off
without hurting investors. Therefore, even if a project could
be financed regardless of fiduciary level, it is more likely to
be undertaken where fiduciary obligations are broader.
That broad fiduciary obligations mitigate managerial
risk-aversion points out why an economy cannot afford to
rely on self-financing as a substitute for broad fiduciary
obligations. Self-financing aggravates the risk of the
project for the entrepreneur. It is practically impossible
that the financial investment in the entrepreneur's own
venture is no greater than would be dictated by a perfectly
diversified investment strategy. Thus, the self-financing
entrepreneur takes not only a risk with human capital (as
does the one who relies on investor financing) but also a
risk with financial capital (while diversified investors do
not). Therefore, we should expect self-financing
entrepreneurs to require more profitability before
undertaking a project than would an investor-financed
entrepreneur.
C. Efficient Market Financing Decisions
Broad fiduciary obligations also align financing decisions
with the social desirability of projects. The remote
opportunities a project may create are part of its social
desirability, part of its potential contribution to the
national product. Narrow fiduciary obligations distort the
decision of financial markets since a project with smaller
but immediate opportunities will appear more lucrative
than a more valuable project that derives most of its value
from the remote opportunities it will generate. Broad
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fiduciary obligations cure this discrepancy because project
investors will include more of the remote value that a
venture will generate in their project assessments.
- In the Meinhard example this becomes obvious if one
compares the social desirability of Meinhard's investment
alternatives: Meinhard could either renovate the Bristol
and prepare further development of the area or he could put
the same money in his wool trade or another more mature
project. Hypothetically, a benevolent central planner would
choose the project that presented the greatest increase in
welfare-the one that would be expected to most increase
the national product. In calculating the national product,
however, the potential to elevate a developing area and
prepare the market for larger projects would be included,
since social welfare includes the creation of all
opportunities. Hence the central planner would take into
account the opportunities each alternative may generate. If
Meinhard expects the project to be regulated by Andrews'
narrow fiduciary duties, he will not include them in his
calculation. For example, if Salmon proposed two projects, a
mature project with richer cash flows and a more "far-
sighted" project, the Bristol, that had the capacity to lead to
further development, clearly the Bristol, the more desirable
project, would not stand out. Cardozo's broad fiduciary
obligations bring the investor's interests closer to those of
society and lead to better investing decisions from the social
welfare perspective.
D. Efficient Managerial Incentives
An extension of this idea of the socially desirable
decision-making of capital markets is that broad fiduciary
duties create socially desirable managerial incentives. If
managers are compensated not only by sharing investors'
returns but also by appropriating opportunities a project
generates, there will be a distortion in the form of
managerial compensation. Projects that generate most of
their value in remote opportunities will offer little
compensation in the form of shareholdings to managers
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who would be reaping most of the remote opportunities.
Projects where most of the payoffs are immediate gains,
will need to compensate managers directly for the
opportunities they forego. Thus, narrow fiduciary
obligations create a bias that disfavors projects with
remote gains. This bias may be unimportant if the
performance of the projects does not depend on managerial
effort. However, when project performance does depend on
managerial effort, managers will not be sufficiently
motivated by the potential gains from opportunity-rich
projects, because managers receive less of their
remuneration in the form of participating in the same
payoffs that investors receive and more of their
remuneration in the form of reaping the project's
opportunities. Thus, the incentives that managers receive
under narrow duties are inconsistent with the goals of both
investors and society. Under narrow duties, Meinhard, for
example, would rather see Salmon reduce costs than
effectuate any increase in the expected value of the remote
opportunity (the expansion). Salmon, on the other hand,
with a reduced share of the cash (under 40%), would rather
increase the expected opportunity by $40 than reduce costs
by $100. The economy, of course, would be indifferent
between wealth created in remote versus immediate
opportunities. Regardless of whether Meinhard succeeds in
motivating Salmon to reduce costs or Salmon gets away
with putting his efforts in the remote value of the project,
society suffers.
Broad obligations, however, realign incentives. Salmon
is unbiased because he receives the same share of
immediate and remote value, as does Meinhard, and both
types of value contribute equally to the national product.
Thus, an economy with broad fiduciary obligations will
have at least four significant advantages over a narrow
fiduciary obligation economy: (1) projects will be financed
that could not otherwise have been; (2) projects will be
undertaken that would not be otherwise, even if they could
have been financed; (3) the financial markets' decisions will
be more beneficial to the economy; and (4) managerial
No. 1:137]
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incentives will be aligned with investor desires and, more
importantly, with social welfare. The moral and the
rhetorical appeal, for which Cardozo's Meinhard is famous,
are trivial compared to its economic effect.
IV. THE LIMITED CHOICE OF FiDucIARY LEVELS
NECESSITATES BROAD OBLIGATIONS
Much of the deregulatory zeal of the economic analysis
of law is the result of excessive confidence in Coase's argu-
ment that parties can negotiate around suboptimal rules.
This renders even optimal rules superfluous if they could be
reached by the parties. 4 To justify legal rules in the face of
the Coasean objection, one must show that parties would be
unable to reach the optimal arrangement unassisted by the
legal system.
The Coasean objection is weak when applied to the issue
of whether fiduciary obligations should be interpreted
broadly or narrowly. Fiduciary obligations should have a
wide scope even if the parties could tailor their scope con-
tractually. Broad fiduciary obligations are obviously neces-
sary to allow parties to meaningfully customize them to
their relationship. The legal system provides for only two
levels of trust and their differentiation is necessary for
them to be useful tools for parties setting up relationships.
In essence, legal systems provide only two levels of loy-
alty between contracting parties, arm's-length and fiduciary
relationships. The difference in the degree of trust that the
two levels of loyalty entitle the parties is dramatic. Fiduci-
ary relations impose a pure duty of loyalty, according to
which the fiduciary must place the interests of his employer
before his own. Arm's-length relations, by contrast, allow
exploitation within the parameters of good faith.
Indirect methods may be developed, however costly and
complex, which allow parties to customize their fiduciary
14 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960). See also generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989) (offering a very
readable elaboration of the Coase "theorem").
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burdens. For example, if the parties want to reduce the par-
ticipation of the financier in future opportunities, they can
divide the financing into debt and equity. Thus, instead of
the stylized Meinhard receiving half of all profits and op-
portunities, he would expect a smaller fraction in exchange
for seniority in the claims against income. Such an ar-
rangement does not necessarily involve debt and the bank-
ruptcy risk it may entail during temporary cash shortages.
The same can be achieved by issuing preferred stock. Thus,
contracting parties can determine the rates with which they
participate in unusual opportunities.
However, since that mix contains only two elements,
contracting parties cannot create levels of fiduciary obliga-
tions outside the two choices: arm's-length or fiduciary rela-
tions. That is, parties cannot agree to give the investor
fewer opportunities than a pure arm's-length relationship
or more opportunities than a pure fiduciary relationship.
The farther apart the legal system keeps the definitions of
the two, the more latitude parties have to fine-tune their
relationships. In order to expand contracting choices, the
two levels of loyalty available must be kept as far apart as
possible. The rhetoric of Meinhard, if nothing else, pre-
serves the expansive interpretation that fiduciary duties
should receive. Without the expansive fiduciary obligations
Cardozo provides, the parties would not be able to require
strict loyalty to govern their obligations even in those cases
where strict loyalty would be desirable. Thus, there are
more compelling justifications for having broad fiduciary
obligations than that they serve as a convenient default
term.
V. CONCLUSION: HONOR IN DEFENSIVE TACTICS
In principle, the way economic forces and incentives op-
erate remains constant, although the technologies, wages,
prices, and interest rates change constantly. Thus, no rea-
son should exist why the economy of the twenty-first cen-
tury should not follow the wise course that Cardozo charted
in Meinhard for that of the twentieth. Indeed, the new Re-
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vised Uniform Partnership Act reflects Cardozo's approach
by maintaining a high fiduciary standard.15 Nevertheless, a
fundamental deviation has arisen in current law., The law
of defensive tactics has constantly been moving farther
from the concept that directors must place shareholder in-
terests foremost.
The field of takeover defense law has witnessed a
movement in support of incumbent management. The
courts' initial stance that directors defending against hos-
tile threats have a conflict of interests in such situations
has been reduced to virtually empty rhetoric. Nearly any
corporate policy will suffice for the courts to allow incum-
bent management to destroy billions of dollars in share-
holder value. 6 Furthermore, state legislatures operating
under the pressure of business and labor, have tried to pro-
vide ammunition to incumbent management in fending off
hostile buyers. 7 The result is that the rightful recipients of
is The new Revised Uniform Partnership Act CRUPA") maintains a
high standard of fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 103(b)(5) (1996) ("The partnership agreement may not . . . (5)
eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.... ."). See Donald
J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The
Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAw. 1, 16-24 (1993). But see Larry E.
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime
time, 49 Bus. LAw. 45, 52 (1993) (attacking this feature of the new
RUPA).Ic The paradigmatic case is Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., where Time's "strategic alliance" with Warner was enough for
the courts to allow management to prevent shareholders from choosing
between the $200 Paramount offer and management's proposed alliance,
worth about $120 per share but in hindsight much less, thus prevented
the shareholders from nearly doubling their money. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1990).
17 The two principal legislative means of protecting the control of
the corporation by incumbent boards are the constituency statutes,
which entitle the board to take into account non-shareholder
stakeholders of the corporation in the exercise of its fiduciary duties, and
the transfer-delaying (but in effect, control-protecting) takeover statutes.
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)
(involving such a takeover statute); see also Roberta Romano,
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes,
61 FoRDHAM L. REV. 843 (1993) (discussing how such statutes have been
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management's fiduciary duties, the shareholders, find their
interests subordinated to a host of other stakeholders in the
firm, including management.
It is very important to note, however, that a frenetic
pace of takeover activity may not be in society's best inter-
ests. While in principle takeovers should accelerate the
transition to new technology, takeover fever entails a tem-
porary danger. As takeovers close old-fashioned plants and
productive processes, they displace employees that need
training and sustenance until they are employable in the
new economy. Too fast a takeover market may displace too
great a fraction of the workforce, leading to poverty, de-
spair, and pauperism. A desirable transition may occur too
fast for comfort. Takeover defenses did help slow the re-
tooling of the American economy and may have prevented
a dramatic social crisis.
At some point in time, however, the legal system should
take its foot off the brake. When the transition of the econ-
omy is nearly complete, there is no reason to sacrifice
shareholder interests any longer. In fact, there could hardly
be a better time to pursue further optimization of industrial
organization than the current one of low unemployment
and steady growth. Courts and legislatures must allow the
market place, once again, to pursue the maximization of
shareholder value.
VI. APPENDIX: BROAD FIDuCIARY DUTIES ENABLE
FINANCING ANiD MITIGATE RISK-AVERSION
A manager-entrepreneur conceives a project which needs
outside financing and managerial effort corresponding to a•
reservation salary x. The venture will generate two types of
payoffs, foreseeable cash flow and probabilistic opportunity.
The venture will produce cash flows f and, with probability
p, will give rise to an opportunity with value o which will lie
at a distance d from the objective of the venture. If d = 0 the
the result of special interest group pressure and are, generally,
undesirable).
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opportunity will have arisen from the venture alone, while
if d = I the opportunity will have arisen purely from efforts
and attributes of the manager that are unrelated to the
venture. The distance d is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1 with cumulative distribution G(x) = x and probability
densityg(x) = 1.
The legal system determines the definition of opportuni-
ties that are considered "corporate" and belong to the en-
terprise, by determining the level of fiduciary obligations.
Thus, the legal system can be considered as setting the fi-
duciary obligation parameter b. If, then, the distance d of
an opportunity from the venture is not greater than the ob-
ligation parameter b (d < b), the courts conclude that the
opportunity belongs to the enterprise. The uniform distribu-
tion of d implies that an opportunity is corporate with prob-
ability b. If, by contrast, an opportunity materializes with a
distance from the project that is greater than the obligation
parameter (d > b), then the courts would award the oppor-
tunity to the manager. Thus, the legal system may choose
an expansive definition of corporate opportunities by set-
ting a large b (closer to 1), or a narrow definition by choos-
ing a small b (closer to 0). It would be false to consider this
a zero-sum game and conclude that expansive definitions of
fiduciary obligations are as onerous for managers as they
are advantageous for investors. Such a conclusion would
only be true if the parties' agreement did not take the level
of fiduciary obligations into account.
The investor requires a competitive return to invest in
the venture, which implies a total expected payment of r.
The investor will be given a share s in the venture. There-
fore, if the opportunity does materialize (with probability p)
and is corporate (with probability b) the investor receives a
share s of the cash f and of the opportunity o. Otherwise,
with probability (1 -pb), the investor receives only his share
s of the cash f, i.e., sf. The investor's expected payoffs must
at least equal r, but competitive capital markets will re-
strict the investor to no more than r, determining his par-
ticipation s:
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pbs(f + o) + (1-pb)sf = r <*
r
f+ pbo
Even if the entrepreneur were risk-neutral, not all at-
tractive ventures could be financed. Narrow fiduciary obli-
gations impose a restriction and only allow the financing of
projects with cash flows that exceed a certain threshold. In
case, for example, fiduciary obligations are set so narrowly,
b = 0, that the investor must receive her return exclusively
from cash flow, the cash flow must not be less than the in-
vestor's required return r. On the surface, for a venture to
be attractive, it must cover the investor's required return r
and the entrepreneur's reservation salary x, meaning that
the sum of cash flow f and expected opportunity po exceed
the sum of the required return r and the reservation salary
x: f + po > r + x. As cash flows decrease, the investor must
receive a greater participation, given that he does not re-
ceive all the opportunities. The upper bound to the partici-
pation of the investor in the project is 100%. Projects that
produce total expected value f+ po in excess of the required
return on capital and the reservation salary r + x will be
feasible only if they can be financed with the investor re-
ceiving no more that 100% of the project. Call the total ex-
pected value of the venture v, where v = f + po. The cash
flows f are a fraction a of total project value, implying f =
av, and o = v(1 - a)/p. The share s of the project that the
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The issue, however, is not to calculate the necessary fi-
duciary obligation b given constant total expected project
value v while the cash-flow ratio a changes. Rather we must
determine the level of fiduciary obligations that investors
require as the total value changes. This requires us to de-
termine the total expected value that is necessary to fi-
nance a project given a constant ratio a of cash flow to total
value as fiduciary obligations change. Solving the above for
v, and setting s = 1, we get:
rV =
a +b -ab
The following figure illustrates how, as cash flows be-
come a smaller fraction of total project value, fiduciary obli-
gations must be broad (b large) for projects to be financed.
An example will illustrate the impossibility of financing
cash-poor projects if fiduciary obligations are low. Suppose
that with a cash investment of $6 and entrepreneurial ef-
fort corresponding to a reservation salary of $4 a project can
be undertaken where total expected project value v is $12.
The investor requires a 10% return, dictating an expected
payment of $6.60. A certain cash flow f constitutes 40% of
value or $4.80. Thus, the project will generate $7.20 in ex-
pected opportunities (in any combination of probability and
magnitude). If fiduciary obligations b are interpreted so as
to award the entrepreneur all opportunities to the creation
of which the entrepreneur has contributed more than 10%
(b = .1), then the total expected value of opportunities
available to the project is $0.72. Therefore, even if the in-
vestor were given 100% of the project by receiving all the
shares, the investor would not receive the required return.
Despite the fact that the project apparently creates a profit
of 20% on the investment, it cannot be financed.
Thus, the proportion of project value that is predictable
cash flow determines whether a project will be financed un-
der the current level of fiduciary obligations. Of course the
effect will vary by the capital intensity of the project and
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the interest rate the investors require, which in turn will
correspond to the project's risk. The following figure pres-
ents a set of feasibility boundaries, i.e., boundaries which,
given a project's total return, indicate what level of fiduci-
ary obligation is necessary for the project to be financed.
The case of projects of moderate capital intensity and mod-
erate interest rates (60% capital, 10% rate) is compared
with the case of projects of high capital intensity (80%) and
high interest rates (20%).
The Feasibility of Projects under
Risk-Neutral Entrepreneurs
Moderate Capital Intensity, High Capital Intensity,
Moderate Interest Rates High Interest Rates
2.0 fe nity 2.0
cash 1.8 . Feasible Feasible
.8 \Projects 1.8 Projects
P-i 1.6 1.6
o60%
1.4 1.40 5 0 *
1.2 1.2
mn ee's bonndary etrnpre s bn
1.0' 1.0
E- 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Level of Fiduciary Obligations (b)
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the limitations of financing oth-
erwise appealing projects due to narrow fiduciary obligations. Projects
require total investment of 1, cash of .6 and managerial/entrepreneurial
activity corresponding to a reservation salary of .4. Investors require
10% return, or r = .66. While the entrepreneur will undertake all proj-
ects with total expected value exceeding 1.06, the investor will only in-
vest if either fiduciary obligations are broad enough to participate in the
opportunities, or if the project is rich in cash flows. The figure graphs
the boundaries for financing projects given the fraction of their total ex-
pected value that is cash flow. This effect will be much more pronounced
as the capital intensity of the project increases where broader fiduciary
obligations will be necessary to finance more projects.
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Assuming that the entrepreneur is risk-averse, ventures
must provide more than r + x to entice the entrepreneur to
undertake them.
The manager-entrepreneur has a utility of wealth func-
tion UO, and a reservation salary x. The entrepreneur's
expected utility from engaging in the venture has three
components. If, with probability 1 - p, the opportunity does
not materialize, the entrepreneur will enjoy the utility of
her share (1 - s) of the cash flow f. If an opportunity that is
corporate materializes, with probability pb, the entrepre-
neur will enjoy the utility of her share of both cash flow and
opportunity, f + o. Finally, if an opportunity arises which
she can appropriate, with probabilityp(I - b), she enjoys her
share of the cash but all of the opportunity. Thus, the en-
trepreneur's expected utility from the venture EU is:
EU = (1- p)U[(1- s)f]+ pbU[(1- s)(f + o)]+
p(1-b)U[(1- s)f + o]
Remember that total expected value of the venture v is f
+ po and that cash flows f = av, and o = v(1 - a)/p. Making
these substitutions in the above formulation of the entre-
preneur's expected utility from the venture, as well as sub-
stituting the investor's share s by r/(f + pbo), and subtract-
ing the entrepreneur's reservation utility U(x), produces the
excess utility of the project y. When that is negative, the
entrepreneur will not engage in the project:
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y =EU -U(x)
(1- P)U[(1 -f +bav +
pbU[rr Cav + v 1 a +
r) v(1a)]IUx
p(1 - b)U (1 - av + UWLk- _ f +pboJ  PJ
The three first terms correspond again to (a) no oppor-
tunity materializing in which case the entrepreneur shares
the cash flow av, (b) an opportunity that is corporate aris-
ing, in which case the entrepreneur shares cash and oppor-
tunity, and (c) a non-corporate opportunity occurring, in
which case the entrepreneur shares the cash but appropri-
ates the opportunity.
To illustrate the feasible ventures while varying the to-
tal value v and the fiduciary obligations b, the following
figure uses the constant relative risk aversion function U(x)
= x'*/(1-9) and a moderate coefficient of risk aversion e =
1.5.8 Because a closed-form solution for the entrepreneur's
indifference curves with y = 0 is unattainable, we must de-
rive numerical solutions. The venture requires a total in-
vestment that is normalized to 1 with the investor supply-
ing capital of .6 and requiring r = .66 and the entrepreneur
providing effort of x = .4. These figures correspond to a
mildly capital intensive project needing 60% of the total
investment in capital on which the investor requires a 10%
return. The opportunity materializes with 40% probability
is See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk-Aversion,
reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARRow at 147 (3d ed.
1984).
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p = .4. The indifference curves separate attractive projects,
where y > 0, from unattractive ones, given projects that
produce their payoffs with different combinations of cash
and opportunity.
This setting will be juxtaposed with one of higher capital
intensity and interest rates where 80% financing is neces-
sary and the investors require a 20% rate. Feasible projects
are again to the upper right and infeasible ones to the lower
left, separated by the indifference curve that is appropriate
for each project's expected mix of cash flow and opportunity.
For example, in a legal regime where the entrepreneur may
appropriate any opportunity to which he has contributed
more than 10%, a project that doubles the invested re-
sources will not be financed if cash flows are 30% of ex-
pected value. However, the project will be financed if cash
flows are 40% or more (point A on the figure). As another
example, consider projects that produce 20% profit and cash
flows that make up 50% of their total expected value. For
such projects to be financed, fiduciary obligations must be
interpreted broadly enough so as to allow the entrepreneur
to appropriate only opportunities to the creation of which
she has contributed by 60% or more (point B on the figure).
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The Feasibility of Projects without
Rich Cash Flows for the
Risk-Averse Entrepreneur
Moderate Capital Intensity, High Capital Intensity,
Moderate Interest Rates High Interest Rates
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Figure 2 illustrates how fiduciary obligations determine the attrac-
tiveness of projects. The level of fiduciary obligation lies on the x axis,
and the total expected value of the venture on the y axis. The left figure
corresponds to a mildly capital intensive project requiring 60% of the
investment in capital on which a 10% return is necessary. The line at v
= 1.06 (marked risk-neutral boundary) corresponds to the total value
which would suffice to make the project attractive assuming risk-
neutrality. The right figure considers projects requiring 80% capital
which must return 20%. Their risk-neutral boundary is at v = 1.16. The
entrepreneur's "break-even curves" demarcate the attractive projects
assuming a different proportion of the project's value comes from its
cash flows (as opposed to the opportunities to which it will give rise).
The more scarce the cash flows, the more expansive fiduciary obligations
must be in order for the entrepreneur to consider the project attractive.
Even a project which is expected to produce 45% of profit, if only 30% of
its returns are in cash flows, will not be undertaken unless fiduciary
obligations are defined expansively so as to give the venture all oppor-
tunities up to those in which the entrepreneur contributes more than
70% to their creation (point C on the left graph). The fact that for cash-
rich projects the optimal fiduciary obligation is fairly low also shows
that a financing vehicle associated with lower or no fiduciary obliga-
tions, such as debt, should also exist.
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Of course, the level of fiduciary obligations would only be
culpable for reduced investment if the individual decisions
of the investor and entrepreneur differ from those of a self-
financing entrepreneur. The self-financing entrepreneur's
opportunity cost of capital is equal to the investor's required
return. The reservation salary remains unchanged. The
self-financing entrepreneur will enjoy all the cash flow and
every opportunity regardless of its distance from the proj-
ect. Therefore, the expected utility has only two terms: ei-
ther the opportunity does not materialize, or it does. The
project will be pursued if its expected utility compensates
for the opportunity cost, the foregone utility of the salary
and return on capital:
EU -U(r + x) = (1- p)U[av]+ pU[v]-U(r + x)
It is impossible to know, however, how much less risk-
averse (than an impecunious entrepreneur) the self-
financing entrepreneur would be. If he were amply wealthy,
he may be risk-neutral with respect to the return on his
capital for it would be part of his diversified portfolio. Oth-
erwise, he may well avoid projects that could have been
pursued under divided financing and management and op-
timal fiduciary obligations. Thus, broad fiduciary duties are
not only necessary for divided financing and management,
but more of the risky projects will be undertaken under di-
vided financing and management than by self-financing
entrepreneurs. Indeed, it would be irrationally optimistic
for legal-economic systems that do not foster financing
separated from entrepreneurship to expect that self-
financing entrepreneurs would undertake all the projects
that would be undertaken under optimal fiduciary obliga-
tions.
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